A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with it. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation. Robust monotonicity is strictly stronger than both Maskin monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for complete information implementation) and ex post monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for ex post implementation). It is equivalent to Bayesian monotonicity on all type spaces.
Introduction
The objective of mechanism design is to construct mechanisms (or game forms) such that privately informed agents have an incentive to reveal their information to a principal who seeks to realize a social choice function. The revelation principle establishes that if any mechanism can induce the agents to report their information, then the agents will also have an incentive to report truthfully in the direct mechanism. Given the beliefs of the agents, the truthtelling constraints then reduce in the direct mechanism to the Bayesian incentive compatibility conditions.
There are two important limitations of Bayesian incentive compatibility analysis. First, the analysis typically assumes a commonly known common prior over the agents' types. This assumption may be too stringent in practise. In the spirit of the "Wilson doctrine" (Wilson, 1987) , we would like implementation results that are robust to different assumptions about what agents do or do not know about other agents' types. Second, the revelation principle only establishes that the direct mechanism has an equilibrium that achieves the social choice function. In general, there may be other interim (or Bayesian) equilibria that deliver undesirable outcomes. 1 We would like to achieve full implementation, i.e., show the existence of a mechanism all of whose interim equilibria deliver the social choice function. We studied the first "robustness" problem in an earlier work, Bergemann and Morris (2005) . The second "full implementation" problem has been the subject of a ✩ This research is supported by NSF Grants #CNS-0428422 and #SES-0518929. We thank Matthew Jackson, the co-editor, Andrew Postlewaite and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. This paper supersedes and incorporates results reported earlier in Bergemann and Morris (2005) . Through our joint authorship of and detailed comments on this draft, Olivier Tercieux has greatly improved this version, including suggesting a strengthening of Theorem 1 and the treatment of responsive social choice functions in Section 6.1. large literature. In the incomplete information context, key full implementation references are Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986) , Palfrey and Srivastava (1989) and Jackson (1991) . In this paper, we study "robust implementation" where we require robustness and full implementation simultaneously. The notion of robust implementation requires that a social choice function f can be interim implemented for all type spaces T . As we look for necessary and sufficient conditions for robust implementation, conceptually there are (at least) two approaches to obtain the conditions. One approach would be to simply look at the interim implementation conditions for every possible type space T and then try to characterize the intersection or union of these conditions for all type spaces. This is the approach we initially pursued, and it works in a brute force kind of way. In Section 6.3, we review what happens under this approach. But we focus our analysis on a second, more elegant, approach. We first establish an equivalence between robust and rationalizable implementation and then derive the conditions for robust implementation as an implication of rationalizable implementation. The advantage of the second approach is that after establishing the equivalence, we do not need to argue in terms of large type spaces, but rather derive the results from a novel argument using the iterative deletion procedure associated with rationalizability. For rationalizable implementation, we fix a mechanism and iteratively delete messages for each payoff type that are strictly dominated by another message for each payoff type profile and message profile that has survived the procedure. 2 The equivalence between robust and rationalizable implementation illustrates a general point well-known from the literature on epistemic foundations of game theory (e.g., Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) , Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) ): equilibrium solution concepts only have bite if we make strong assumptions about type spaces, i.e., we assume small type spaces where the common prior assumption holds. We exploit the equivalence between robust and rationalizable implementation to obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for robust implementation in general environments. Our necessity argument is conceptually novel, exploiting the iterative characterization. The necessary conditions for robust implementation are ex post incentive compatibility of the social choice function and a condition -robust monotonicity -that is equivalent to requiring Bayesian monotonicity on every type space. This condition is strong and implies Maskin monotonicity -necessary and almost sufficient for complete information implementation -but is strictly weaker than dominant strategy implementation.
The sufficiency argument requires only a modest strengthening of the necessary condition by guaranteeing that the preference profile of each agent satisfies a (conditional) no total indifference property. Under this no total indifference property, we show that the necessary conditions are also sufficient for robust implementation. The sufficient conditions guarantee robust implementation in pure, but also in mixed strategies. Our robust analysis thus removes the frequent gap between pure and mixed strategy implementation in the literature.
In this paper, we follow the classic implementation literature in allowing for arbitrary mechanisms, including modulo and integer games. By allowing for these mechanisms, we are able to make tight connections with the existing implementation literature. Allowing for these badly behaved mechanisms does complicate our analysis: for example, we must allow for transfinite iterated deletion of best responses in our definition of rationalizable implementation. Given the complications arising from infinite mechanisms, we report new necessary conditions for robust implementation in the context of finite mechanisms. We also report how our earlier research can be used to show that these necessary conditions are sufficient conditions for finite mechanisms either in well-behaved, but restricted, environments (Bergemann and Morris, 2009a) or under a virtual rather than exact implementation requirement (Bergemann and Morris, 2009b) .
Our results extend the classic literature on Bayesian implementation due to Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986) , Palfrey and Srivastava (1989) and Jackson (1991) . We focus in this paper on an indirect approach to extending these results. We first note the equivalence between robust implementation and rationalizable implementation. We then exploit the equivalence to report a direct argument showing that robust monotonicity is a necessary and almost sufficient condition for rationalizable implementation. But in the light of the classic literature, we know that a necessary and almost sufficient condition for robust implementation must be Bayesian monotonicity on all type spaces. We confirm and clarify our results by directly checking that robust monotonicity is equivalent to Bayesian monotonicity on all type spaces. Fig. 1 gives a stylized account of the connection between these alternative approaches.
In the implementation literature, it is a standard practice to obtain the sufficiency results with augmented mechanisms. By augmenting the direct mechanism with additional messages, the designer may elicit additional information about undesirable equilibrium play by the agents. Yet, in many applied economic settings, single crossing or supermodular preference assumptions allow direct implementation. In a companion paper, Bergemann and Morris (2009a) , we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for robust implementation in the direct mechanism. The main results there apply to environments where each agent's type profile can be aggregated into a one-dimensional sufficient statistic and where preferences are single crossing with respect to that statistic. These restrictions incorporate many economic models with interdependence in the literature. We show that besides an incentive compatibility condition, in this case the strict ex post incentive compatibility condition, a contraction property which requires that there is not too much interdependence in agents' types, together present necessary and sufficient conditions for robust implementation in the direct mechanism.
The robust monotonicity condition is stronger than both the Maskin and the Bayesian monotonicity conditions. In the context of robust implementation, we can ask whether a relaxation from the exact to the virtual implementation condition 2 We use rationalizability (and rationalizable implementation) in this paper to refer to the "robust" version of the solution concept where payoff types are not known but any beliefs about others' payoff types are considered. We will later discuss the relation to implementation in rationalizable strategies in complete information settings and interim versions of rationalizability (Dekel et al., 2007) . may lead to more permissive results. In Bergemann and Morris (2009b) we characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions for robust virtual implementation. There we show that a social choice function can be robustly virtually implemented if and only if the social choice function is ex post incentive compatible and robust measurable. We establish here that robust measurability remains a necessary condition for robust (exact) implementation, but it is not sufficient anymore.
The results in this paper concern full implementation. An earlier paper of ours, Bergemann and Morris (2005) , addresses the analogous questions of robustness to rich type spaces, but looking at the question of partial implementation, i.e., does there exist a mechanism such that some equilibrium implements the social choice function. We showed that ex post (partial) implementation of the social choice function is a necessary and sufficient condition for partial implementation on all type spaces.
3 This paper establishes that an analogous result does not hold for full implementation. In a related paper, Bergemann and Morris (2008a) , we therefore investigate the notion of ex post implementation. The necessary and sufficient conditions there straddle the implementation conditions for Nash and Bayesian-Nash respectively, as an ex post equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium at every incomplete information (Bayesian) type profile. However in contrast to the iterative argument pursued here, the basic reasoning in Bergemann and Morris (2008a) invokes more traditional equilibrium arguments. By comparing the conditions for ex post and robust implementation, it becomes apparent that robust implementation typically imposes additional constraints on the allocation problem. In Bergemann and Morris (2008a) , we showed that in single crossing environments, the same single crossing conditions which guarantee incentive compatibility also guarantee full ex post implementation. In contrast, in the aggregation environment discussed above, we show that robust implementation imposes a strict bound on the interdependence of the preferences, which is not required by the truthtelling conditions. A contraction mapping behind the iterative argument directly points to the source of the restriction of the interaction term. Our results provide a characterization of rationalizable implementation in incomplete information environments. In a recent work, , we have adapted the arguments to characterize rationalizable implementation in complete information environments.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the formal environment and solution concepts. Section 3 gives necessary and sufficient conditions for rationalizable implementation. Section 4 establishes an (almost) equivalence relation between rationalizable and robust implementation and then reports the necessary and sufficient conditions for robust implementation. Section 5 establishes necessary conditions for robust implementation in finite mechanisms. Section 6 discusses extensions and variations of our implementation results, examining the role of lotteries and pure strategies and the relationship with Nash equilibrium and ex post equilibrium implementation. Appendix A contains some additional examples.
Setup

The payoff environment
We consider a finite set of agents, 1, 2, . . . ,
There is a set of outcomes Z . We assume that each Θ i and Z are countable. 4 Each individual has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u i : Z × Θ → R. Thus we are in the world of interdependent types, where an agent's utility depends on other agents' payoff types. We allow for lotteries over deterministic outcomes. 
We assume throughout that the function θ i : T i → Θ i is surjective, and hence that the type space is at least as large as the payoff type space.
Mechanisms
A planner must choose a game form or mechanism for the agents to play in order to determine the social outcome.
Let M i be the countably infinite set of messages available to agent i. We denote the generic message by m i ∈ M i and let
be the distribution over outcomes if action profile m is chosen. Thus a mechanism is a
Solution concepts
Now holding fixed the payoff environment, we can combine a type space T with a mechanism M to get an incomplete information game (T , M). The payoff of agent i if message profile m is chosen and type profile t is realized is then given
(t) .
A pure strategy for agent i in the incomplete information game (T , M) is given by
A (behavioral) strategy is given by
The objective of this paper is to obtain implementation results for interim, or Bayesian Nash, equilibria on all possible types spaces. The notion of interim equilibrium for a given type space T is defined in the usual way. 
Definition 1 (Interim equilibrium
Requiring "robust" implementation, i.e., for "all type spaces", will push the solution concept in the direction of rationalizability. Consequently, we define a message correspondence profile S = (S 1 , . . . , S I ), where each
6 One reason why the extension to social choice correspondences is not straightforward is that, with social choice correspondences, the incentive compatibility conditions that arise from requiring partial implementation are typically weaker than ex post incentive compatibility, as shown by examples in Bergemann and Morris (2005 
The operator b : S → S is now defined as:
We observe that b is increasing by definition: i.e., S
We can also construct the fixed point S M by starting with S -the largest element of the lattice -and iteratively applying the operator b. If the message sets and types are finite, we have
But because the mechanism M may be infinite, transfinite induction may be necessary to reach the fixed point. 7 It is useful If message sets are finite (or compact), a well-known duality argument implies that never best responses are equivalent to strictly dominated actions. However, the equivalence does not hold with infinite (non-compact) message sets. 8 In a compact message analysis, Chung and Ely (2001) consider a version of this solution concept in an incomplete information mechanism design context with dominated (not strictly dominated) messages deleted at each round. The solution concept defined through the iterative application of the operator b is weaker than the notion of interim rationalizability for a given type space T , as defined by Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) and Dekel et al. (2007) . Under b, every agent i is allowed to hold arbitrary beliefs about Θ −i and is not restricted to a particular posterior distribution over Θ −i . On the other hand, if the type space T were the universal type space, then S M i (θ i ) would be equal to the union of all interim rationalizable actions of agent i over all types t i ∈ T i whose payoff type profile coincides with θ i , or θ i (t i ) = θ i .
Implementation
We now define the notions of interim, robust and rationalizable implementation.
Definition 2 (Interim implementation).
Social choice function f is interim implemented on type space T by mechanism M if the game (T , M) has an equilibrium and every equilibrium σ of the game (T , M) satisfies
(t) .
A tradition in the implementation literature commonly restricts attention to pure strategy equilibria, but we allow mixed strategy equilibria.
7 Lipman (1994) contains a formal description of the transfinite induction required (for the case of complete information, but nothing important changes with incomplete information). As he notes "we remove strategies which are never a best reply, taking limits where needed". 8 The following example, suggested to us by Andrew Postlewaite, illustrates the non-equivalence. Players 1 and 2 each choose a non-negative integer, k 1 and k 2 respectively. The payoff to player 1 from k 1 = 0 is 1. The payoff to player 1 from action k 1 1 is 2 if k 1 > k 2 , 0 otherwise. For any belief that player 1 has about 2's actions, there is a (sufficiently high) action from player 1 that gives him a payoff greater than 1. Thus action 0 is never a best response for player 1. However, for any mixed strategy of player 1, there is a (sufficiently high) action of player 2 such that action 0 is a better response for player 1 than the mixed strategy. Thus action 0 is not strictly dominated.
Definition 3 (Robust implementation).
Social choice function f is robustly implemented by mechanism M if, for every T , f is interim implemented on type space T by mechanism M. Social choice function f is robustly implementable if there exists a mechanism M such that f is robustly implemented by mechanism M.
The notion of robust implementation requires that we can find a mechanism M which implements f for every type space T . A weaker requirement would be to ask that for every type space T there exists a, possibly different, mechanism M such that f is implemented. This weaker notion would still lead to the same necessary condition as the stronger implementation version we pursue here, and we believe that it would not lead to a change in the sufficiency conditions either.
Definition 4 (Rationalizable implementation).
Social choice function f is rationalizably implementable by mechanism M if
Social choice function f is rationalizably implementable if there exists a mechanism M such that f is rationalizably implementable by M.
Part (1) of the definition requires that every rationalizable message profile leads to an outcome consistent with the social choice function. Part (2) requires that rationalizable messages exist. The existence of rationalizable message is automatically guaranteed if M is finite. In infinite mechanism, the existence requirement is strong: we require that for each belief that agent i may have over the payoff types of the other agents, there exists a belief over the rationalizable messages that other agents might send such that agent i has a best response, whatever his payoff type. Following Theorem 1, we will report why our proof would not go through, in general, under weaker versions of this requirement; but in Section 6.1, we report how the best response property could be weakened in the special case where the social choice function is responsive, so that distinct payoff types of an agent always lead to distinct outcomes under the social choice function, for at least one payoff type profile of the other agents.
Note that if a best response exists for agent i to a conjecture over rationalizable messages, as in part (c), then by part (1), every rationalizable action of agent i will be a best response. Thus we could strengthen property (c) in the definition of rationalizable implementation to
without strengthening the definition.
Rationalizable implementation
Necessity
The following ex post incentive compatibility condition is a necessary condition for robust truthful (or partial) implementation as established in Bergemann and Morris (2005) .
Definition 5 (EPIC). Social choice function f satisfies ex post incentive compatibility (EPIC) if
But a strengthening of this condition will be necessary for robust full implementation.
Definition 6 (Semi-strict EPIC).
Social choice function f satisfies semi-strict ex post incentive compatibility (semi-strict EPIC) if,
Next we present the monotonicity conditions which are at the core of the robust implementation results. It is useful to first think about agents playing the direct mechanism, where each agent i reports his payoff type. An agent i may or may not report truthfully. A deception is a set-valued profile β = (β 1 , . . . , β I ), where
for all i and all θ i . A deception of agent i with payoff type θ i is a set of possible reports by agent i. Thus a deception of payoff type θ i includes, but is not restricted to, θ i itself.
unacceptable if it is not acceptable.
In this language, the truthtelling "deception", defined by β * i (θ i ) θ i for all θ i is an acceptable deception. Other deceptions of agent i may also be acceptable if the social choice function does not vary with respect to some subset of reports of agent i for all type profiles of the other agents. The inverse mapping of a deception β i represents the set of true type profiles θ i which could lead to a report θ i and we write
A "robust monotonicity" condition is key to our main result. If a deception is "unacceptable," it must be possible to "refute"
it. In the direct mechanism, where agents other than i report themselves to be types θ −i , agent i can obtain outcomes f (θ i , θ −i ) for any θ i . But once we allow augmented mechanisms, we can offer agent i a larger set of lotteries if he reports deviant behavior of his opponents. We need to identify, for any given report profile θ −i , the set of lotteries with the property that whatever agent i's actual type, he would never prefer such an allocation to what he would obtain under the social choice function if other agents were reporting truthfully. Thus:
Henceforth, we refer to the set Y i (θ −i ) as the reward set (for agent i). Suppose now that there was common certainty that in the direct mechanism, type θ i of agent i will send a report θ i ∈ β i (θ i ). But if β is not acceptable, we must find a type of some agent who is prepared to report that other agents are misreporting. But for the "whistle-blower" who is going to report that we are in a bad equilibrium, we cannot know what he believes about the types of the other agents, nor can we know what message he expects to hear except that it is a message consistent with the deception. We thus have to allow for all possible beliefs ψ i of agent i over payoff types θ −i ∈ Θ −i consistent with a report θ −i from a given deception profile β, or
Finally, the reward that he is offered must not interfere with the truth-telling behavior in the good equilibrium, i.e., it must belong to the reward set corresponding to report θ −i .
Definition 8 (Refutable deception). A deception β is refutable if there exist
there exists y such that:
and for all θ i ∈ Θ i :
The deception is strictly refutable if, for all θ i with f (θ i , θ −i ) = y, the inequality (4) is strict.
This gives the following conditions:
Definition 9 (Robust monotonicity). Social choice function f satisfies robust monotonicity if every unacceptable deception is refutable. Social choice function f satisfies strict robust monotonicity if every unacceptable deception is strictly refutable.
It turns out that robust monotonicity implies the incentive compatibility conditions described above, by considering simple deceptions where a single type of one player has a single possible misreport.
Lemma 1. If f satisfies robust monotonicity, then f satisfies semi-strict EPIC.
is unacceptable. Thus, by robust monotonicity, it is refutable. So for any θ −i , there exists y such that
which establishes semi-strict EPIC. 2
When we prove in Theorem 2 that robust monotonicity (together with an additional condition) is sufficient for rationalizable implementation, we use the fact that every unacceptable deception is refutable. However, in proving the necessity of strict robust monotonicity in our next result, we use the contrapositive statement that is closer to Maskin's original formulation of monotonicity: a social choice function satisfies strict robust monotonicity if every deception that is not strictly refutable is acceptable. 10 For this argument, it is useful to observe that a deception is not strictly refutable if, for each i,
implies
We now establish a necessary condition for rationalizable implementation.
Theorem 1 (Necessary conditions). If f is implementable in rationalizable strategies, then f satisfies strict robust monotonicity (and thus semi-strict EPIC).
By Lemma 1, semi-strict EPIC is also necessary. In the following proof of the theorem, note that some extra steps are required to deal with the fact that best responses need not exist to all conjectures agents might have about others' types and messages.
Proof. Let M be a mechanism that implements f in rationalizable strategies. Suppose that β is not strictly refutable. Define
We claim that S β b(S β ). To see why, fix any i, θ i , θ i ∈ β i (θ i ). Because β is not strictly refutable (see (5) and (6)), there exist θ −i ∈ Θ −i and ψ i ∈ (β
implies By the definition of rationalizable implementation, see Definition 4.2, there exists a belief over the messages m −i , given
for all θ i ∈ Θ i . Now, for every m i ∈ M i , define
for if not, then m i would be rationalizable for type θ i , contradicting rationalizable implementation. But now, by (7),
for all m i , and thus, for any m i ∈ S M i (θ i ) we have:
We observe that the proof of strict robust monotonicity used the full strength of rationalizable implementation given in Definition 4.2. In particular, it was required that the same distribution over rationalizable messages of other agents,
, guaranteed a best response for every payoff type θ i of agent i.
Sufficiency
We will need a very weak economic condition to ensure that it is always possible to reward and punish each agent independently of the other agents.
Definition 10 (Conditional no total indifference). The conditional no total indifference
The conditional no total indifference property imposes a very weak restriction on the preferences. The conditional NTI property, together with the use of lotteries, allows us to dispense with any no veto property which typically appear in the sufficient conditions. In addition, we can omit the usual cardinality assumption of I 3. A related no total indifference condition appears in the context of virtual implementation in Duggan (1997) , who requires it to hold at every ex post profile θ and in Serrano and Vohra (2005) , who require it at the interim level for a given belief ψ i (θ −i ) of player i.
Theorem 2 (Sufficient conditions). If f satisfies robust monotonicity and the conditional NTI property, then f is rationalizably implementable.
Proof. We explicitly construct the implementing mechanism. The mechanism will use "interior" lotteries over the deterministic outcome set Z and over the reward sets Y i (θ −i ). Given an arbitrary labelling of the outcome set Z = {z 0 , z 1 , . . . , z k , . . .}, we define an "interior" lottery over the set Z by y (y 0 , y 1 , . . . , y k , . . .),
for some δ ∈ (0, 1). For every given profile θ −i , the reward set Y i (θ −i ) is by construction a convex set with at most a countable number of extreme points. We denote the set of extreme points of
) and for some labelling of the points in the set we have
(θ −i ) may be a deterministic or a random outcome and assigns probability y l,θ −i (z k ) to the pure outcome z k . For every reward set Y −i (θ −i ), we define an "interior" lottery:
where the lotteryȳ θ −i is a compound lottery. pick the interior lotteryȳ (as defined in (9)). 
Each agent i sends a message
m i = (m 1 i , m 2 i , m 3 i , m 4 i ), where m 1 i ∈ Θ i , m 2 i ∈ Z + , m 3 i : Θ −i → Y with m 3 i (θ −i ) ∈ Y i (θ −i ),
Claim 1. It is never a best reply for type θ i to send a message with m
To wit, the allocationȳ, the interior lottery, has full support on the set of deterministic outcomes. By the conditional NTI property, it follows that there exists a pair of lotteries (y, y ) which can be strictly ranked and hence m 4 i can generate a more favorable lottery than the interior lotteryȳ, which results in (11). And we also know from the conditional NTI property that there exists m 3 i such that, if 
Proof of Claim 2. Now fix any S with
We will argue that if β is not acceptable, then b(S) = S. By robust monotonicity, we know that there exists i,
) is never a best response for type θ i . We conclude that if
Proof of Claim 3. This is an immediate consequence of EPIC, which (by Lemma 1) is implied by strict robust monotonicity. 2
It now follows from Claims 1-3 that f is rationalizably implemented. 2
Observe that since robust monotonicity and conditional NTI are sufficient for rationalizable implementation, and strict robust monotonicity is necessary for rationalizable implementation, it follows that robust monotonicity and conditional NTI must imply strict robust monotonicity. It is straightforward to check this directly.
We allowed for badly behaved infinite mechanisms in order to make a tight connection with the existing literature and to get tight results. Many authors have argued that "integer game" constructions, like the one used in the above theorem, should be viewed with suspicion (see, e.g., Abreu and Matsushima (1992a) and Jackson (1992) ).
A coordination example
We conclude this section with an example that demonstrates that while rationalizable implementation is a strong requirement, it is weaker than dominant strategy implementation. In the example there are two agents, i = 1, 2. Each agent 
.
Suppose we iteratively remove actions for each type that could never be a best response given the type action profiles remaining. Thus in the first round, we would observe that type θ 1 would never send message θ 1 and type θ 1 would never send message θ 1 . Knowing this, we could conclude that type θ 2 would never send message θ 2 and type θ 2 would never send message θ 2 . This in turn implies that neither type of agent 1 will ever send message ζ . Thus the only remaining message for each type of each agent is truth-telling. But now they must behave this way in any equilibrium on any type space.
Robust implementation
We now establish the equivalence between rationalizable and robust implementation. We first report a formal epistemic argument that relates the rationalizable messages to the set of messages that might be played in any equilibrium on any type space. We use the notation of type spaces that we introduced in Section 2.2.
Proposition 1 (Rationalizable actions). m i ∈ S M i (θ i ) if and only if there exists a type space T , an interim equilibrium σ of the game (T , M) and a type t i ∈ T i such that
). Now consider the following type space T defined through
By the definition of rationalizability, we know that for each
and
. Now by construction, there is a pure strategy equilibrium s with
(⇐) Suppose there exists a type space T , an equilibrium σ of (T , M), and m
, which concludes the proof. 2
We emphasize that the above equivalence result does not guarantee that there exist an equilibrium on every type space. Since there may be an infinite number of messages, the existence of an equilibrium is in fact not guaranteed. We will use the following condition in establishing the existence of interim equilibria on all type spaces. The condition uses the notion of message correspondence S defined in Section 2.4. 
Definition 11 (Ex post best response
This condition requires that for each i and θ i , there is a single message which is rationalizable whatever agent i's beliefs about others' payoff types.
Theorem 3 (Almost equivalence).
If f is rationalizably implementable by mechanism M, and S M satisfies the ex post best response property, then f is robustly
implementable by mechanism M.
If f is robustly implementable by mechanism M, then f is rationalizably implementable by mechanism M.
Proof. (1) By the ex post best response property, there exists, for each i, s
for all θ −i . Now fix any type space. The strategy profile s with
is an equilibrium of the game (T , M). Thus an interim equilibrium s(t) with the property that g(s(t)) = f ( θ(t)) exist for every type space T . Now by Proposition 1, every equilibrium action m i which is chosen with positive probability, σ i (m i |t i ) > 0, is also a rationalizable action.
(2). Suppose (T , M) has an equilibrium for each T . Fix any i and ψ i ∈ (Θ −i ). Fix any type space T with, for each
and (c)
for all θ i and θ −i . The game has an equilibrium σ . Let m i be any message with
Proposition 1 implies that every message profile m j which is played in equilibrium by type θ j is part of the set S M , or that:
By construction of the type space T , in particular property (c) as expressed by (14), this implies that
Since these properties hold for arbitrary i and ψ i ∈ (Θ −i ), part (2) of the definition of rationalizable implementation is satisfied. 2 It is unfortunate that there is a gap in the above proposition. However, an example in the appendix shows that it is possible to construct (admittedly silly) mechanisms where (T , M) has an equilibrium for each T , but S M fails the ex post best response property. Corollary 1.
If f is robustly implementable, then f satisfies EPIC and strict robust monotonicity; 2. If f satisfies EPIC, robust monotonicity and the conditional NTI property, then f is robustly implementable.
Proof. (1.) It follows immediately from Theorem 3.2 that if f robustly implementable then it is also rationalizably implementable, and if follows from Theorem 1 that if f is rationalizably implementable, then it satisfies EPIC and strict robust monotonicity.
(2.) By Theorem 2, if f satisfies EPIC, robust monotonicity and the conditional NTI property, then f is rationalizably implementable. Now since f satisfies EPIC, we observe that S M must satisfy the ex post best response property, with type 
Finite mechanisms
In this section, we restrict attention to finite mechanisms, i.e. where each M i is finite. All the results in this section extend to compact or, more generally, "regular" mechanisms (e.g., mechanisms where best responses always exist as in Abreu and Matsushima (1992b) ). We present a different necessary condition -robust measurability -that arises when attention is restricted to finite mechanisms. 11 We can also use the case of finite mechanisms to discuss the relationship with some of our earlier work providing sufficient conditions for implementation using well behaved mechanisms by (i) restricting attention to more restrictive environments (Bergemann and Morris, 2009a) or (ii) allowing virtual implementation (Bergemann and Morris, 2009b) .
Necessary condition
We report an additional necessary condition (from Bergemann and Morris (2009b)) for robust implementation in finite mechanisms. We are interested in the set of preferences that an agent might have if his payoff type is θ i and he knows that the type θ j of each opponent j belongs to some subset Ψ j of his payoff types Θ j . Write R for the set of expected utility preference relations on lotteries Y . We will write R θ i ,ψ i ∈ R for the preference relation of agent i if his payoff type is θ i and he has belief ψ i ∈ (Θ −i ) about the types of others:
We write R i (θ i , Ψ −i ) for the set of preferences agent i might have if his payoff type is θ i and he might have any beliefs over others' payoff types:
Say that type set profile Ψ −i separates Ψ i if
2 Θ i be a profile of type sets for each agent. Say that Ξ is mutually inseparable if, for each i and
Definition 12 (Robust measurability). Social choice function f satisfies robust measurability if
If payoff types are finite, one can give an alternative iterative definition of robust measurability: let Ξ 0 i = 2 Θ i , and inductively define: and 11 While the stronger necessary conditions apply even if we allow infinite payoff type spaces, clearly only very restrictive social choice functions can be implemented by finite mechanisms in this case.
Now we say that a social choice function f satisfies robust measurability if Bergemann and Morris (2009b) showed that robust measurability was necessary for robust virtual implementation; thus it must also be necessary of robust exact implementation. For completeness, we report a direct argument here.
Proposition 2 (Necessity of robust measurability). If social choice function f is robustly implementable by a finite mechanism, then f satisfies robust measurability.
Proof. Since f is robustly implementable, there exists a mechanism M such that
Now suppose Ξ is mutually inseparable. We argue by induction that, for all i, Ψ i ∈ Ξ i and k there exists a set of messages
. This is true by definition for k = 0. Suppose that it is true for k. Now Ξ being mutually inseparable implies that for any Ψ i ∈ Ξ i , there exists Ψ −i ∈ Ξ −i , R and, for each θ i ∈ Ψ i , λ
(Ψ i ) be the optimal messages of agent i when he believes that his opponents will sent some message profile in M k −i (Ψ −i ) with probability 1 and has beliefs λ θ i i about the type profile of his opponents, i.e.,
In Appendix A of the working paper version, Bergemann and Morris (2008b) , we show by means of two examples that robust monotonicity does not imply nor is it implied by robust measurability.
Sufficient conditions
We have pursued two ways of deriving sufficient conditions in prior work. First, we showed that if we weaken the implementation requirement to virtual implementation (Bergemann and Morris, 2009b) , then the above robust measurability condition is sufficient (under weak conditions ruling out indifference). Second, we identified natural restrictions on the environment that make the necessary conditions sufficient (Bergemann and Morris, 2009a) ; we briefly review this result below. If we neither put restrictions on the environment nor allow virtual implementation, then we do not know how to derive tight sufficient conditions for finite, or other well-behaved, mechanisms. However, as in the existing literature on complete and incomplete information implementation, it was possible to obtain tight conditions only if we allow for badly behaved mechanisms.
Single crossing aggregator environments
In Bergemann and Morris (2009a) , we consider payoff environments in which each payoff type space Θ i is completely ordered and where there exist for each i, an aggregator function h i : Θ → R and a valuation function
where h i is continuous and strictly increasing in θ i and v i : Y × R → R is continuous and satisfies the following strict single crossing property: for all φ < φ < φ ,
The aggregator functions h = (h i )
are said to satisfy the contraction property if, for all deceptions β = β * , there exists i, θ i and θ i ∈ β i (θ i ) with θ i = θ i , such that
for all θ −i and θ −i ∈ β −i (θ −i ). We recall that we earlier defined β * as the truthtelling "deception", with β * i (θ i ) = θ i , for all θ i ∈ Θ i and all i. In single crossing aggregator environments as described by (15) and (16), the contraction property is equivalent to both strict robust monotonicity and robust measurability.
We say that a social choice function f is responsive if for all θ i = θ i , there exists
Proposition 3 (Contraction property). In a single crossing aggregator environment, a responsive social choice function f is robustly implementable if and only if it satisfies strict ex post incentive compatibility and the contraction property.
This result is reported in Theorem 1 and 2 of Bergemann and Morris (2009a) . It follows that the necessary conditions of Theorem 1 are also sufficient in these environments. Note that in the discrete type setting of this paper, the continuity properties are automatically satisfied if the payoff type spaces are finite. Bergemann and Morris (2009a) allowed for compact payoff type spaces and pure outcome spaces; they also showed that when robust implementation is possible, it is possible in a "direct" mechanism where agents report just their payoff types.
Extensions, variations and discussion
Responsive social choice functions
In Bergemann and Morris (2009a), we considered a less general environment and also assumed that the social choice function was responsive in the following sense:
Definition 13 (Responsive social choice function). Social choice function f is responsive if, for all i and θ
Thus a social choice function is said to be responsive if distinct payoff types lead to distinct outcomes under the social choice function. Because the objective of this paper was to investigate general environments and social choice functions, we did not assume responsiveness here. However, we briefly note in this section how some of our results -in particular, the necessity arguments -can be strengthened with responsiveness but in the general payoff environment of this paper. First, semi-strict EPIC immediately implies strict EPIC: Definition 14 (Strict EPIC). Social choice function f satisfies strict ex post incentive compatibility (strict EPIC) if, for each i,
Second, under strict EPIC, strict robust monotonicity is implied by the following weakening:
Definition 15 (Strict pairwise robust monotonicity).
A social choice function f satisfies strict pairwise robust monotonicity if, for every unacceptable deception β,
exists y such that:
and:
If we required condition (17) is to hold not only for θ i , but also for any θ i , then this condition becomes strict robust monotonicity. We label it "pairwise" monotonicity because it involves only pairwise comparisons of types.
Finally, for responsive social choice functions, we can also establish necessary conditions under a less stringent definition of rationalizable implementation. In particular, we can weaken the requirement (c) from Definition 4.2 of rationalizable implementation by dropping the uniformity condition: "for all θ i ∈ Θ i " and instead can allow the belief λ i ∈ (M −i × Θ −i ) to depend on the type θ i . We can also establish the necessity of semi-strict EPIC and strict pairwise robust monotonicity under this weakened notion, and, as noted above, with responsive social choice functions, the former implies strict EPIC and the latter imply strict robust monotonicity. The proofs of the claims in this subsection are in the appendix of the working paper version . These result are analogues of complete information results developed in Bergemann et al. (2010). 12 
Finite outcomes and states and duality
We say that an environment is finite if pure outcome space Z and payoff type spaces Θ i are all finite. We can give a simpler characterization of when a deception is refutable and thus when a social choice function satisfies robust monotonicity in finite environments:
Lemma 2 (Refutable deception). In finite environments, a deception β is refutable if there exist
Theorem 4 (Equivalence). Social choice function f satisfies Bayesian monotonicity on every type space if and only if it satisfies robust monotonicity.
The equivalence is established by a constructive proof via a specific type space. The constructive element is the identification of a type space on which Bayesian monotonicity is guaranteed to fail if robust monotonicity fails. The specific type space is much smaller than the universal type space. The proof of this result is in the appendix of the working paper version, Bergemann and Morris (2008b) .
The notion of robustness is more subtle in the context of full rather than partial implementation. With partial implementation, i.e. truthtelling in the direct mechanism, the universal type space is by definition the most difficult type space to obtain truthtelling. In the universal type space, every agent has the maximal number of possible misreports and hence the designer faces the maximal number of incentive constraints. In the context of full implementation, the trade-off is ambiguous. As a larger type space contains by definition more types, it offers every agent more possibilities to misreport. But then, just as a larger type space made truthtelling more difficult to obtain, the other equilibria might also cease to exist after the introduction of additional types. This second part offers the possibility that larger type spaces facilitate rather than complicate the full implementation problem.
But note that this line of argument would establish the necessity of robust implementation if the planner is restricted to deterministic mechanisms (a disadvantage) but he can assume that agents follow pure strategies (an advantage). How do these assumptions matter?
First, observe that the advantage of restricting attention to pure strategies goes away completely when we require implementation on all type spaces: if there is a mixed strategy equilibrium that results in a socially sub-optimal outcome on some type space, we can immediately construct a larger type space (purifying the original equilibrium) where the socially sub-optimal outcome is played in a pure strategy equilibrium. Thus our robust analysis conveniently removes that unfortunate gap between pure and mixed strategy implementation that has plagued the implementation literature.
We use the extension to stochastic mechanisms in just two places. Ex post incentive compatibility and robust monotonicity would remain necessary conditions even if we restricted attention to deterministic mechanisms (the arguments would be unchanged). If lotteries were not allowed, our sufficiency argument would require a strengthened version of the robust monotonicity condition, with the lottery y replaced by a deterministic outcome. Our sufficiency argument also uses lotteries under Rules 1 and 2. As in recent papers by Benoit and Ok (2008) and Bochet (2007) on complete information implementation, we use lotteries to significantly weaken the sufficient conditions, so that we require only the conditional NTI property in addition to EPIC and robust monotonicity. If we did not allow lotteries in this part of the argument, we would require a much stronger economic condition in the spirit of Jackson's "Bayesian monotonicity no veto" condition. We have developed combined robust monotonicity and economic conditions (not reported here) sufficient for interim implementation on all full support types spaces. However, an additional complication is that, without lotteries in the implementing mechanism, we cannot establish sufficiency on type spaces where agents have disjoint supports.
It is possible to construct a simple example where EPIC and robust monotonicity are not sufficient for robust monotonicity without lotteries by taking the coordination example of Section 3.3 but removing the outcomes z and z . As we show in Appendix A, robust implementation is then not possible in this example despite the fact that the social choice function selects a unique strictly Pareto-dominant outcome at every type profile.
Ex post and robust implementation
In contrast to the earlier results in Bergemann and Morris (2005) , where we showed that robust partial implementation is equivalent to ex post incentive compatibility, robust implementation is in general a more demanding notion of implementation than ex post equilibrium implementation. In Bergemann and Morris (2008a) we have analyzed ex post equilibrium implementation. The monotonicity condition there, called ex post monotonicity, is identical to the robust monotonicity condition up to the notion of deception. For ex post monotonicity we have to verify point-to-point deceptions, α i : Θ i → Θ i , whereas for robust monotonicity we have to verify point-to-set deceptions β i : Θ i → 2 Θ i /∅. The following simple example, introduced by Palfrey and Srivastava (1989) , is useful to relate the different implementation notions and also to understand the role of interdependent types.
Consider a setting with three agents where each agent has two possible "payoff types", θ a or θ b . There are two possible choices for society, a or b. All agents have identical preferences. If a majority of agents (i.e., at least two) are of type θ y , then every agent gets utility 1 from outcome y and utility 0 from the other outcome. The social choice function agrees with the common preferences of the agents. Thus f : {θ a , θ b } 3 → {a, b} satisfies f (θ) = y if and only if #{i: θ i = θ y } 2.
Clearly, ex post incentive compatibility is not a problem in this example. The problem is that in the "direct mechanism"
-where all agents simply announce their types -there is the possibility that all agents will choose to always announce θ a . Since no agent expects to be pivotal, he has no incentive to truthfully announce his type when he is in fact θ b . What happens if we allow more complicated mechanisms? If there were complete information about agents' preferences, then the social choice function is clearly implementable: the social planner could pick an agent, say agent 1, and simply follow that agent's recommendation.
But suppose instead that there is incomplete information about agents' preferences. In particular, suppose it is common knowledge that each agent's type is θ b with independent probability q, with q 2 > 1 2
. This example fails the Bayesian mono-tonicity condition of Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986) and Jackson (1991) . Palfrey and Srivastava (1989) observe that it is also not possible to implement in undominated Bayesian Nash equilibrium in this example. In contrast, it is easy to construct an augmented mechanism whose only ex post equilibrium delivers the social choice function. Let each agent send a message m i ∈ {θ a , θ b } × {truth, lie}, with the interpretation that an agent is announcing his own type and also sends the message "truth" if he thinks that others are telling the truth and sends the message "lie" if he thinks that someone is lying. Outcome y is implemented if a majority claim to be type θ y and all agents announce "truth"; or if either 1 or 3 agents claim to be type θ y and at least one agent reports lying.
There is a truthtelling ex post equilibrium where each agent truthfully announces his type and also announces "truth". Now suppose there exists an ex post equilibrium such that at some type profile, the desired outcome is not chosen. Note that whatever the announcements of the other agents, each agent always has the ability to determine the outcome y, by sending the message "lie" and -given the announcements of the other agents -choosing his message so that an odd number of agents have claimed to be type θ y . So this is not consistent with ex post equilibrium.
Robust implementation is impossible in this example. Consider the type space where there is common knowledge that whenever an agent is type θ y , he assigns probability 1 2 to both of the other agents being type y = y and probability 1 2 to one being type y and the other being y . Thus every type of every agent thinks there is a 50% chance that outcome a is better and a 50% chance that b is better. Evidently, there is no way of designing a mechanism that ensures that agents do not fully pool. But if they fully pool, robust implementation is not possible.
Extensions
The previous sections examined the importance of our assumptions about lotteries over outcomes and restrictions on mechanisms. We also restricted attention in our main analysis to the case of discrete but infinite pure outcomes Z , payoff types Θ i and types T i . While most of our results would extend naturally to more general Z , Θ i and T i , the formal treatment of non-compact type spaces would raise technical issues that we have chosen to avoid. By the equivalence between strict domination and never a best response (see Theorem 2.10 in Gale (1989) ), there exists y * ∈ Y with u i (y * , (θ i , θ −i )) > u i (y, (θ i , θ −i )) for all θ −i ∈ Θ −i . This establishes the conditions of the lemma. 2
Appendix A
A.1. Robust monotonicity and dual robust monotonicity
A.2. A badly behaved mechanism
The example illustrates the gap between the necessary and sufficient conditions in Theorem 3. Specifically, it shows that there can be an equilibrium for every type space T in a mechanism, yet S M does not satisfy the ex post best response property. In the example, there are two agents and there is complete information, so each agent has a unique payoff type.
There 
